COMMENTS
Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies
in Section 1983 Cases
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code' provides a private
federal remedy for deprivation of federal civil rights under color of
state authority. This statute has been one of the most frequently litigated
federal statutes, 2 and the Supreme Court's apparent relaxation 3 of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in section 1983 cases
has contributed to a continuing increase in this litigation.
The Supreme Court has more recently, however, indicated a concern
with the concept of a relaxed exhaustion requirement, and has suggested
that in certain cases the traditional exhaustion doctrine is appropriate.
In Preiserv. Rodriguez,4 the Court refused to liberally construe habeas
corpus cases as section 1983 claims, and thus declined to relieve the
habeas corpus litigant of the statutory exhaustion requirement. 5 In
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
States or other
person within
the jurisdiction
privileges,
or immunities
secured
by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2 Section 1983 litigation has increased rapidly in the past twenty-five years. This
phenomenon has been noted at two different points of development. Note, The Proper
Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1953); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL Vmw 75-107 (1973). The impact of this increase on the federal system
was persuasively stated in Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal
Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. 0.
557 (1973).
3 This trend, which began with the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), is discussed in text at notes 25-42 infra.
4 411 U.S. 475 (1973). See text and notes at notes 43-50 infra.
5 Exhaustion in habeas corpus cases is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the application has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
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Gibson v. Berryhill,6 decided the same day as Preiser,the Court noted
in dictum that the traditional exhaustion requirement might apply
were completely prowhere the litigant's rights under section 1983
7
process.
administrative
tected during the state
These recent developments suggest that this is an appropriate time to
re-evaluate the exhaustion principle in section 1983 cases. This comment will focus on exhaustion in section 1983 cases to determine
whether a relaxed requirement is necessary or appropriate in terms
of federalism, sound judicial administration, and the purposes of section
1983. The comment first examines the nature of the exhaustion requirement and the rationale for its application to state administrative
rather than judicial remedies. Next, it considers relaxation of the exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases, and examines the purposes of
section 1983 in light of the rationale for exhdustion. The comment
concludes that relaxation of the exhaustion requirement in section 1983
cases is not necessary to satisfy considerations of federalism or the purposes of section 1983, and suggests an alternative exhaustion requirement for section 1983 cases modeled on section 704 of the Administra8
tive Procedure Act.
I.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The Doctrine
The federal courts follow a general rule that an administrative action-by either a state or a federal agency-will not be reviewed unless
the plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative remedies." The
A.

1 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
Id. at 574-75.

7

8 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
9 The exhaustion requirement is the result of two fundamental principles: 1) that questions should be decided by those most competent to do so, and 2) that questions should be
decided in an orderly way. Judge Coffin succinctly stated the first of these principles in
Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410, 415 (1st Cir. 1973): "The exhaustion requirement, as
it applies to administrative agencies, is no mere technical rule to enable courts to avoid
difficult decisions. It is grounded in substantial concerns not only of fairness and orderly
procedure ... but also of competence. Courts are not best equipped . . . to judge the
merits of the scientific studies and the objections to them. Specialized agencies . . . are
created to serve that function." The second principle supporting the exhaustion requirement was indicated by Justice Holmes when he wrote, in an early habeas corpus case,
that although "both executive officers . . . are acting without authority, it is one of the
necessities of the administration of justice that even fundamental questions should be
determined in an orderly way." United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 168 (1904). See
also United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 1183, 190-91 (1939). The exhaustion principle allows
agency and court to perform their respective tasks by segregating them on the basis of
time. See K. DAvis, ADMINISraATIvE LAw TREATIsE § 20.01 (1958); cf. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISrRATIVE ACTION 424-32 (1965); J. LANDIs, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
153 (1938); S. DR SmIH, JUDICIAL R2vIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 3-9, 111-20 (3d ed. 1973).
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courts recognize, however, several exceptions to this rule. First, the administrative agency must have jurisdiction over the controversy.' 0 For
example, a federal court will not require an interstate carrier subject
to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to exhaust
its administrative remedies within a municipal agency that has no jurisdiction over the carrier." Second, the courts do not require exhaustion
of remedies that are judicial in nature .' Third, the doctrine does not
require exhaustion of unnecessary, inadequate, or futile administrative
remedies.' 3 Exhaustion is not required, for example, where the agency
10 In Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 562 (1919), Justice Brandeis
distinguished between relief sought on the basis of an excessive rate or a discriminatory
practice and an act in excess of an agency's statutory powers: "If plaintiff had sought relief
against a rate or practice alleged to be unjust because unreasonably high or discriminatory,
the remedy must have been sought primarily by proceedings before the Commission. ....
But plaintiff does not contend that 75 cents is an unreasonably high rate or that it is
discriminatory or that there was mere error in the action of the Commission. The contention is that the Commission has exceeded its statutory powers; and that, hence, the order
is void. In such a case the courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin the enforcement of
an order, even if the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before
the Commission."
11 See Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
12 The distinction between administrative and judicial remedies for the purposes of
exhaustion rests on the fact that an administrative determination does not ordinarily
have the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a judicial determination. See text and
notes at notes 67-73 infra. Significantly, it is the character of the remedy rather than that
of the tribunal which is dispositive. A state court may be empowered to act administratively, and in such instances exhaustion of administrative remedies will be required.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908). Cf. Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S.
134 (1914), in which the Vermont Constitution provided that the state supreme court
could act only judicially. The Supreme Court held that state law was controlling in regard to the powers of the state court and that the state court's action would be judicial
despite the attempt of the legislature to invest it with legislative power. Because the court's
judicial determination would have res judicata effect, exhaustion was not required. See also
1 W. BARRON &A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAanCE AND PROCEDURE § 64 (C. Wright ed. 1960).
Prentis concerned federal judicial review of state rate orders, which was subsequently
limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958), which states:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance
with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State
administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the
order to the Federal Constitution; and,
(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and,
(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing, and,
(4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.
13 The Supreme Court of the United States recently noted that "the basic purpose of
the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within
its special competence-to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its
own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 US. 84, 37 (1972).
Because the relative importance of these factors and the capacities of the particular agency
involved will vary from case to case, the exhaustion doctrine must be applied with an
"understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved."
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). For example, where the controversy
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has taken action to deny the litigant access to the appeal process,1 4 or
where the agency does not have the authority to grant the requested
relief.15 Finally, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required
where the litigant will be subject to irreparable injury due to lengthy
administrative procedures that fail to provide interim relief. 16
B. The Rationale
conThe requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies 17
tinues as a well-settled doctrine of federal judicial administration. It
does so primarily because it facilitates an efficient allocation of judicial
resources,' 8 while protecting the litigant's choice of forum and the
state's interest in local regulation.' 9 The exhaustion requirement proinvolves only a question of statutory interpretation and there is no need for the application of agency expertise or the development of a factual record, exhaustion will not be
required. Id. at 197-98.
14 See Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177 (Ist Cir. 1970), in which the court found
exhaustion not to be required where a school superintendent attempted to deny a teacher
access to the administrative procedures established by state law. Denial of access may be
accomplished in this manner simply by dilatory administrative inaction. As one commentator has noted: "The big discretionary power all along the line may be the seemingly
omnipresent power to do nothing." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TExcr § 401 (3d ed.
1972).
15 See Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943),
in which the rate orders of which plaintiffs complained, if made, would have intruded
into an area of exclusive federal regulation. Compare L. JAM' supra note 9 at 437-38,
with 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at § 20.02.
16 In Oklahoma Natural Gas v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923), the state remedy in question was administrative but the Court held that excessive delay, compounded by a refusal
to grant a supersedeas writ, would nullify the otherwise applicable exhaustion requirement
where a constitutional issue was raised. Justice Holmes stressed the fact that the company
had "done all that they can under the state law to get relief and cannot get it." Id. at 293.
Significantly, the Court indicated in Oklahoma Natural Gas that it would look not only
at the state exhaustion scheme as it existed in statute, but also at how it functioned in
fact. The requirement that exhaustion of state administrative remedies be predicated on
the availability in fact of interim relief was reaffirmed in Pacific Telephone Co. v. KuyKendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924).
17 C. WRIGr, LAw OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 49 (2d ed. 1970); See also 3 K. DAVIS, supra
note 9, at § 18.02; id. (Supp. 1970); F. JAMEs, CIVIL PRocEDuRE § 11.35 (1965).
18 Dean Landis said of this dimension of the administrative-judicial relationship that
"one can ask little more than to have issues decided by those who are best equipped for
the task." J. LANDIS, supra note 9, at 153. The role of the courts is to determine whether
the agency's fact-finding, rule-making and enforcement processes conform to legal requirements; ordinarily courts are equipped to deal with technical issues only through a seriously
inefficient reallocation of judicial resources.
19 Justice Black considered a related aspect of this problem in his discussion of comity
in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971):
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means
centralization of control, over every important issue in our National Government and
its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent
is a system in which thert is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
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vides a state agency with an opportunity to correct its own errors, thus
reducing the likelihood of resort to the federal courts for resolution of
the dispute. 20 Exhaustion also promotes judicial economy by providing
the federal court with an opportunity to profit from the agency's expertise, its experience in the administration of its own statutes and
regulations, and the agency's ability to generate a more thorough21 and
relevant factual record, especially in areas of complex regulation.
22
Since the res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of state court
and federal agency determinations 23 do not attach to a state adminisNational Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors
to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States.
Although it is frequently asserted that the Civil Rights Acts and other Reconstruction
statutes changed the nature of American federalism and expanded the role of the federal
courts, the question remains as to the precise extent of this change. See Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 288-39 (1972). The limited jurisdiction conferred on the federal judiciary by
Article III of the Constitution remains the guiding principle of federal jurisdiction and

requires that the federal courts not make needless incursions into state matters.
20 Systematic circumvention of adequate administrative remedies is almost certainly

counterproductive. As Professor Jaffe has suggested, such abuse of the administrative
process is likely to cause a "dislocation of the administrative scheme." L. JAFFE, supra note
9, at 452. Moreover, immediate judicial review of decisions made at low levels of the
administrative machinery tends to exalt the correction of individual bad decisions at the
expense of a systematic correction of bad decision-making processes. As Herbert Simon

has written in a slightly different context: "Under ordinary circumstances... the function

of correcting the decisional processes of the subordinate which lead to wrong decisions is

more important than the correcting of wrong decisions." H.

SIMON,

ADMINISTRATIVE BE-

235 (1960). In terms of judicial and administrative efficiency, the proper view seems
to be that suggested by Judge Brown in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1177
(5th Cir. 1972): "The federal courts are open for § 1983 redress: But it is to redress wrongs
of a city, or a county, or a school board, or a state, not wrongs of the city engineer, the
county highway supervisor, or the state director of utilities." Although the Supreme Court
held in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1973), that a city is not a "person"
within the meaning of section 1983, and thus as a formal matter cannot be made a defendant under section 1983; that holding does not diminish the force of Judge Brown's
analysis: section 1983 actions should be addressed to persons who are capable of redressing the harm rather than the lowest persons in the administrative framework.
21 See Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (Ist Cir. 1973); Nor-Am Agricultural Products,
Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970). An alternative approach has been noted by
Professor Jaffe, who suggests that an emphasis on the complexity of the issues and the
expertise of the agency "permits false implications and creates damaging expectations
with respect to those agencies it does purport to describe." Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal
Administration, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1183, 1184 (1973). Jaffe suggests that such a model
neglects the political realities of the administrative process. Id. at 1189-90. See also W.
GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 27-29 (1941).
22 See Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914).
23 The exhaustion rule with regard to federal administrative remedies was articulated
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). In Hearst,
the Court held that an agency determination would stand if "reasonable," even though
the reviewing court might entertain a different view. This principle presupposes, how-
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trative decision, the exhaustion of state administrative remedies requirement accomplishes this efficient allocation of judicial resources
without unduly limiting the litigant's right to a federal forum.
II.

EXHAUSTION IN SECTION 1983 CASES

Prior to Monroe v. Pape,2 4 the Supreme Court had strongly suggested,
although it never explicitly ruled, that the exhaustion doctrine applied
to cases brought under' section 1983.25 Most lower federal courts re20
quired exhaustion of administrative remedies in section 1983 cases
without regard to the substantive nature of the claim.
In Monroe, the Court held that a plaintiff in a section 1983 case
was not required to exhaust state judicial remedies. 27 The decision is
ever, the constitutionality of the underlying statute, the fairness of the administrative procedure employed, and the agency's jurisdiction to act. These factors may present the opportunity for judicial nullification of the agency's determination even where a statute
seems to preclude judicial review. See L. JAFFE, supra note 9, at 153-55.
24 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
25 In Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), a Black plaintiff sought damages from state
officials who had denied him the right to register to vote, acting under color of a state
registration statute which he alleged violated the fifteenth amendment. The defendant state
officials relied on Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908), for the proposition
that federal relief would not lie because plaintiff had not exhausted his state judicial
remedies. The Court reaffirmed the distinction drawn in Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S.
134 (1914), between judicial and administrative remedies and held that exhaustion of
state judicial remedies was not a prerequisite to federal judicial relief. The implication
of Justice Frankfurter's opinion was that a different result could be expected if state administrative remedies were involved:
Normally ... [state administrative remedies] must be completed before resort to the
federal courts can be had ....
But the state procedure open [here] ... hbs all the
indicia of a conventional judicial proceeding and does not confer upon the Oklahoma
courts any of the discretionary or initiatory functions that are characteristic of administrative agencies . . . . Barring only exceptional circumstances . . . or explicit
statutory requirements ... resort to a federal court may be had without first exhausting the judicial remedies of state courts.
'Lane v. Wilson, 807 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).
26 Despite some confusion, in the early 1950s, as to the meaning of the rule of Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), by mid-decade lower courts generally held that state administrative, but not judicial, remedies must be exhausted prior to federal intervention. See Dove
Iv. Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th "Cir. 1960); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.
1959); Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1958); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724
(4th Cir. 1956); Williams v. Dalton, 231 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1956); McDonald v. Key, 224
F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955); Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1951); Cooper v. Hutchison,
184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950). See also Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Act, 66
HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1953).
Because of the limited scope given section 1983, Professor Chafee was able to base his
argument for new civil rights legislation on the ineffectiveness of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act, describing it as an "unintelligible statute" and a "bent and blunted sword." Chafee,
Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights, 27 GEo. WAsr. L. Rav. 519, 526-27 (1959).
27 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Although the Supreme Court had already determined this question in lane v. Wilson, 307 US. 268 (1939), Justice Douglas did not cite the earlier case.
In fact, the only way in which Lane differed from Monroe was that while the state officials
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so broadly worded as to suggest that there is no requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies in those cases. Four subsequent Supreme Court opinions28 have been interpreted by courts29 and
commentators30 as confirmation of a relaxed exhaustion requirement.
Each of the cases, however, involved situations in which traditional
principles would not have required exhaustion.
In the first of these opinions, McNeese v. Board of Education,8 ' a
group of Black plaintiffs sued in federal district court for an order
requiring desegregation of a local school system. The court of appeals
affirmed a district court dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies available under
the state education law. 2 The Supreme Court concluded that the availin the earlier case were enforcing an unconstitutional state statute, the local police officers
in Monroe acted in excess of their authority and in violation of state law. The principal
"under color"
issue in Monroe was whether such ultra vires acts could constitute action
of state law. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). The Monroe briefs show that the plaintiffs cited Lane for the
proposition that availability of state judicial remedies was not a bar to a federal suit
under section 1983. Petitioners' Brief at 13, 15-16. There is no reference in the respondents'
brief to the exhaustion issue, indicating that their exhaustion argument had been given
up by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. The only plausible reason for the
Court's failure to cite Lane is that it chose to state the issue in broader terms than the
earlier case permitted, so as to encompass all state remedies within its statement of the
exhaustion principle: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
Although Monroe itself concerned only judicial remedies and the broader language used
by the Court is only dictum, it is dictum which has successfully obscured the necessary
distinction between administrative and judicial remedies in subsequent cases.
28 Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Damico
v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
29 Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973); Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d
1133 (5th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Hayes v. Secretary of
Dep't of Public Safety, 455 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1972); Chisley v. Richland Parish School Bd.,
448 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1971); LeVier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Rainey
v. Jackson State College, 435 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1970).
30 Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1352 (1970); Note, 72
CoLuM. L. REv. 1078 (1972); Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights
Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1968); Note, Limiting Section 1983 in the Wake of Monroe
v. Pape, 82 HARV. L REv . 1486 (1969); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for
UnconstitutionalPolice Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1969).
31 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
32 Under ILL. REv. SAT., ch. 122, § 22-19 (1961), the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction was required to hold a hearing regarding allegations of racial imbalance upon
complaint by fifty residents or 10 percent of a school district (whichever was lesser). The
State Superintendent was then required to decide whether the allegations were substantially
correct and request the Attorney General, if he also so found, to file a suit. Any decision
of the Superintendent would be reviewable by the courts, but the determination by the
Attorney General would presumably be unreviewable because of his prosecutorial discretion.
The effect of this process was to force the plaintiff to follow, at considerable public and
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able state' administrative remedy was inadequate, and reversed the dismissal of the complaint.3 3 The Court's citation of Monroe v. Pape
implied that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in
section 1983 cases.
In Damico v. California,3 4 a group of welfare claimants challenged
as unconstitutional a state welfare law making a paternal absence of three
months a prerequisite for payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children. A three-judge court dismissed the complaint for
failure to exhaust state administrative remedies.3 5 The Supreme Court,
citing Monroe and McNeese, reversed in a per curiam opinion. In King
v. Smith 36 the Supreme Court held that a three-judge court had properly refused to require state welfare claimants in a section 1983 case
to exhaust their state administrative remedies prior to resorting to the
federal courts to challenge a state welfare regulation as unconstituprivate expenses, a lengthy administrative process which might result in an entirely
political decision by the Attorney General not to prosecute. See Petitioner's Brief at 28-29,
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
33 The Court based its holding both on an extension of Monroe and on the finding
that "it is by no means clear that Illinois law provides petitioners with an administrative
remedy sufficiently adequate to preclude prior resort to a federal court for protection of
their federal rights." 373 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1963). Although Justice Harlan dissented in
McNeese on other grounds, he later argued that McNeese both misinterpreted and gratuitously extended Monroe, since it was the prevailing view in McNeese that the state administrative procedures were inadequate in fact. See Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416,
418-19 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan was unable to distinguish convincingly Monroe in McNeese. Three modes of
distinction were available to him. The first was based on the type of relief sought; in
Monroe the federal court had intervened only to provide damages, whereas plaintiffs in
McNeese sought injunctive relief. Harlan asserted that "a sound respect for the independence of state action required the federal equity court to stay its hand." 373 U.S. 668, 677
(1963); the majority was not convinced by this reasoning. The second distinction wa the
one he attempted to raise in Damico in order to rewrite the holding in McNeese: the
adequacy of the state remedy. Since Harlan did not share the majority's view that the
remedy was inadequate in fact, he was in no position in McNeese to argue for that narrower
holding. The third distinction was one that escaped even Harlan's circumspection: the
conceptual and practical difference between administrative and judicial remedies.
34 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
35 California did not argue the distinction between administrative and judicial remedies,
but attempted instead to distinguish McNeese on the theory that the remedy involved in
McNeese was entirely a state remedy whereas the remedy in Damico was a hybrid federalstate remedy entitled to particular deference. Respondent's Motion to Affirm at 5-6. Only
Justice Harlan was persuaded by the state's argument. He argued in dissent that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's supervision of state welfare programs made
federal judicial intervention inappropriate. 389 U.S. 416, 419 (1967). What Harlan failed
to understand was that the futility of exhaustion was only enhanced by the failure of the
federal executive to exercise its statutory duty with respect to the supervision of state
welfare administration where state regulations may be inconsistent with federal law.
36 392 U.S. 309 (1969).
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tional.8 7 Finally, Houghton v. Shafer38 was a suit by a state prisoner to
recover his law books, which were confiscated under prison regulations.
The court of appeals affirmed without opinion the dismissal for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. In reversing, the Supreme Court
explicitly noted the probable futility of an administrative appeal to
the state Attorney General, who had submitted to the Court an opinion
that the prison regulations were valid and had been properly applied to
the prisoner. 39
The Second Circuit has rejected the view that these four opinions
abolished the exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases. In Eisen v.
Eastman,40 Judge Friendly argued that exhaustion is still required in
section 1983 cases and that these four cases come under the traditional
limitations to the exhaustion doctrine covering inadequate or futile
administrative remedies. 41 In McNeese the Court held that the avail37 In a footnote, the Court stated that a section 1983 plaintiff is not required to exhaust
administrative remedies where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to
require the convening of a three-judge court. Id. at 312 n.4. The introduction of the
three-judge court requirement narrows rather than codifies the Court's previous statement
of the law. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, a three-judge court must be convened when an injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by
restraining an officer engaged in such enforcement or in the enforcement of an administrative determination made thereunder; the injunction must be sought on the ground of
unconstitutionality. Apart from the fact that this statement does not codify the Court's
earlier holdings, it is unsatisfactory because there is no reason to assume that it limits
section 1983 in a way that is relevant to the statutory intent. Federal jurisdiction in
section 1983 cases is usually founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which gives to federal courts
"original jurisdiction" in civil rights cases; under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, there is no requirement
that the state officer be acting in the enforcement of a state statute or that his action
violate the Constitution. What relationship do these additional barriers have to the
language of section 1983, which makes no distinction between violations of federal law and
violations of the federal Constitution nor between wrongs under color of state statute and
wrongs accomplished by ultra vires acts of state officers?
88 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
39 Again, the Court's opinion used language that was broader than necessary. The state
Attorney General certified that the prison authorities' action was in strict compliance with
rules enforced throughout the Commonwealth. Moreover, the prisoner had attempted to
appeal to higher administrative authority and had been told to "leave well enough alone."
rd. at 640. The Court conceded that the official policy of the Commonwealth was being
challenged and that nothing could be gained from requiring exhaustion, but noted: "In
any event resort to these remedies is unnecessary in light of our [earlier] decisions .... " Id.
40 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
41 Id. at 567-69. Judge Friendly has been a persistent critic of the use of section 1983
in expanding federal jurisdiction and has argued in favor of exhaustion and abstention
where possible. See H. FRMNDLY, supra note 2, at 75-107. In James v. Board of Educ., 461
F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), the Second Circuit stated:
"It is still the law in this Circuit . . . that a Civil Rights plaintiff must exhaust state
administrative remedies." See also Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Ray v.
Fritz, 468 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1972); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971),
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able administrative remedies -were inadequate, and in Shafer the Court
noted the futility of an appeal to the state Attorney General. Damico and
King involved constitutional challenges to a state statute and a state
regulation; Judge Friendly maintained that in those cases the administrative remedies were inadaquate because in Damico the state agency
had no authority to declare a state statute unconstitutional and in King
42
it was unlikely that the agency would change the welfare regulation.
The Supreme Court undermined Judge Friendly's argument in Wilwording v. Swenson,43 a habeas corpus case challenging state prison conditions. The Court rejected the suggestion that its holding in Shafer
was based on the futilty of the appeal: "Although the probable futility
of such administrative appeals was noted, we held that in 'any event,
resort to these remedies is unnecessary.' -44The Court's willingness to
extend its liberalized exhaustion principle seemed unambiguous when it
held in Wilwording that, for exhaustion purposes, the plaintiffs were
entitled to have their habeas corpus claim treated as if it had been
brought under section 1983.45 Two cases recently decided by the Court,
however, suggest that the liberalization of exhaustion requirements
for section 1983 cases has reached its limits.
In Preiserv. Rodriguez46 the Supreme Court held that relief in the
nature of habeas corpus must be sought under the habeas corpus
statute,47 which requires exhaustion, rather than under section 1983. Although Wilwording was distinguished as challenging only the conditions and not the duration of imprisonment, 48 Preiser indicates a
genuine shift in the Court's perspective. In Wilwording, the Court
seemed anxious to find fungibility between the habeas corpus claim
rev'd on rehearingen banc, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Blanton v. State University of
New York, Nos. 73-1088 & 73-1259, 2d Cir., Nov. 19, 1978 (unreported opinion), in which
the Second Circuit reaffirmed its earlier view in light of Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973)) Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972), and Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249

(1971).
42 Eisen was in fact a double-barreled attempt at cutting back the scope of section 1983.
Judge Friendly also asserted in Eisen that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was limited to the
protection of personal rights. 421 F.2d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 1969). Justice Stewart explicitly
rejected this view in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 588, 551 n.19 (1972).
43 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
44 Id. at 252.
45 The willingness of the Court to treat habeas corpus and section 1983 cases as fungible
was underscored by the procedural posture of the case: the plaintiffs had previously
brought a section 1983 action which was denied after a full hearing. The writ of habeas
corpus was sought on the same facts, only to be held by the Supreme Court as entitled
to treatment as a section 1983 case. Chief Justice Burger was understandably disturbed by
this sleight of hand. See id. at 252-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
46 411 U.S. 475 (1978).
47 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
48 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1978).
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and section 1983, and did so despite the fact that the habeas corpus
claim had previously been brought and had failed as a section 1983
50
claim. 49 Preisermust be seen to undercut the trend of Wilwording

Gibson v. Berryhill,51 a section 1983 action that sought a federal injunction against state license revocation proceedings because of unconstitutional bias in the licensing board, was decided the same day as
Preiser.The Court held exhaustion unnecessary where the administrative board was challenged as unconstitutionally composed, but suggested that a liberalized exhaustion principle might be inappropriate
where the state has provided an administrative remedy by which "the
individual charged is to be deprived of nothing until the completion
of that proceeding .... -52 Although this statement is dictum, it represents a potentially important qualification of the section 1983 exhaustion rule, and a new approach that would re-emphasize the adequacy of
the state remedy. The importance of this dictum was not lost on Justices Marshall and Brennan, who concurred "except insofar as it suggests
that the question remains open whether plaintiffs in some suits brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may have to exhaust administrative remedies."53
III.
A.

THE CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES

Immediate Protection of Fundamental Federal Rights

Nonexhaustion of state judicial remedies can be justified on the
ground that they merely duplicate the section 1983 remedies available
in federal court.5 4 This justification clearly does not apply, however,
See 404 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50 Justice Brennan rejected the majority's distinction between section 1983 claims and
habeas corpus: "In sum, the absence of an exhaustion requirement in § 1983 is not an
accident of history or the result of careless oversight by Congress or this Court. On the
contrary, the no-exhaustion rule is an integral feature of the statutory scheme. Exhaustion
of state remedies is not required precisely because such a requirement would jeopardize
the purposes of the Act." 411 U.S. 475, 518 (1973). As a matter of historical interpretation,
this analysis is questionable. See text and notes at notes 74-78 infra. Compare Justice
Brennan's opinion for a unanimous court in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973), where he said: "Any analysis of the purposes and scope of § 1983 must take cognizance of the events and passions of the time at which it was enacted," id. at 425. He noted
further: "we [are] not at liberty to recast this statute to expand its application beyond
the limited reach Congress gave it." Id. at 432.
51 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
52 Id. at 574-75.
53 Id. at 581.
54 In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), the Supreme Court held that the federal
judicial remedy was supplementary to the state judicial remedy in section 1983 cases, and
therefore the state remedy need not be exhausted prior to seeking federal relief. The
underlying rationale seems to be that judicial remedies are essentially interchangeable,
whether enforced by the state or federal judiciary. Section 1983, by itself, merely states a
cause of action, while 28 U.S.C. § 1343 grants original jurisdiction to the federal courts.
49
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to state administrative remedies. A reading of the commentary and
cases under section 1983 suggests that application of the special exhaustion principle developed in Monroe and its progeny to state administrative actions is justified by the fundamental character of the rights
protected by that statute 5 The underlying proposition is that the only
practical device to insure protection of these rights is circumvention
of all state administrative remedies in favor of immediate federal adjudication. 6 Even assuming that it is possible both to define fundamental rights 57 and to show that the rights protected by section 1983
are categorically fundamental rights,-5 immediate federal adjudication
through a relaxed exhaustion requirement is not necessary to provide
immediate protection for these rights.59
Presumably section 1983 claims could be litigated in state courts although they would be
subject to removal to a federal forum. See Hirych v. State, 376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910
(1965); Clarke v. Sullivan, 99 R.I. 96, 205 A.2d 828 (1964).
55 Justice Douglas stated this view succinctly in McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668, 674 (1963): "It is immaterial whether respondents' conduct is legal or illegal as
a matter of state law. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts."
The justification for this statement is that "wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights
under the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication .... Id.

at 674 n.6 (1963).
56 The argument that section 1983 actions should be immediately cognizable in federal

courts, irrespective of the state remedy's adequacy in practice, stems from an unrealistic
view of the capacity of the federal courts. See Chevigny, supra note 30, at 1359, which
asserts that "[t]he federal judiciary serves the important function of ombudsman for those
whose personal rights have been violated." This view has led Judge Coffin to note that, "A
judge is tempted to conclude that the chief weapon expected to forestall Orwell's 1984 is
the United States Code's § 1983." Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U.L.
R v. 567, 570 (1970). It is difficult to see how immediate federal adjudication is better
designed to safeguard fundamental federal rights than an approach that distinguishes
between adequate and inadequate state administrative remedies. See text and notes at
notes 67-73 infra.
57 In fact, the definition is not analytically easy. The cases generally make no attempt
to define fundamental rights, perhaps with the view that, like obscene works, a judge will
know them when he sees them. Traditionally, the courts have held that equity will not
intervene to protect personal rights. See In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888). In Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972), however, the Court held that the
conventional dichotomy between personal and property rights would not withstand analysis. See also Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 533-34, 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1946).
The difficulty of reaching consensus on the definition of fundamental rights, is indicated
by Justice Blackmun's comment in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 761
(1971): "The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution."
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58 The variety of the case law defies attempts at finding any conceptual integrity. See,
e.g., Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972); Hutchens v. Alabama, 466 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1972); Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Wardrop v. Dean, 459 F.2d 1030 (3d Cir. 1972). See also H. FRIENDLY,
supra note 2, at 95; Coffin, supra note 56, at 570.
59 Judge Aldisert believes that there is no "rational relationship between federal civil
rights actions for personal money judgments against underpaid prison guards, wardens and

1974] ,

Exhaustion in Section 1983 Cases

The relevant inquiry in determining whether exhaustion is required
should be the adequacy of a particular remedy in providing the desired
relief-in this case immediate protection of section 1983 rights-rather
0
than the character of the rights asserted.6
If the primary concern of the
Court is immediate protection of section 1983 rights, complete relaxation of the exhaustion requirement is unnecessary. Exhaustion of state
administrative remedies will not interfere with the exercise of section
1983 rights in those cases in which the deprivation does not take place
until the conclusion of the state administrative process."' Although the
deputy wardens and the reluctance of state legislatures to spend the funds needed to clean
up horrible conditions in the prisons." Aldisert, supra note 2, at 565-66. This conclusion
about prisons is expandable in two directions. First, it is applicable to other spheres of
administration insofar as poorly paid officers and clerks exercise discretionary power
throughout the government. Second, it is applicable where equitable relief is sought: an
injunction is subject to its own peculiar infirmities as a rule of law addressed to individuals
and of limited precedential value. As such, it is particularly susceptible to a "law of the
case" analysis after the manner of argument made by Southern officials regrouping after
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Frankel, The Alabama Lawyer,
1954-1964: Has the Official Organ Atrophied?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1243, 1249-50 (1964).
The impact of an injunction depends on the structure of the administrative machinery at
which the injunction is aimed, the role and influence of the particular addressees within
the machinery, and the outside political pressures in favor of or against the injunction.
See Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971); Denenberg, The U.S. Supreme Court: An Introductory Note, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 134, 140, 144 (1971). Since an injunction is legally binding only upon the persons actually addressed, the effectiveness of the
injunction as a reform mechanism wiU depend in part on its nonmandatory collateral
force. In an organization that has many power centers and little administrative integration,
the effects of an injunction against a single power center will have minimal effects elsewhere.
60 The Supreme Court noted this principle in the context of federal administrative
remedies in W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967), holding that
exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required even in the adjudication of
constitutional claims if the development of a factual record would aid the courts in resolving the dispute and the administrative procedures are fair and adequate. See also A
Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which the court said
"[t]he governing concept as expressed in both judicial doctrine and statute may require
even constitutional claims to be determined on the administrative record when the administrative procedure is fair and adequate for presentation of material facts." Id. at 861.
61 An example is a license revocation process where the individual charged with malpractice or abuse of his license is allowed to practice until the completion of the administrative proceeding and thus is deprived of nothing until the administrative process has
run its course. The Supreme Court noted this possibility in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 575 (1973), and indicated that the licensing revocation procedure in that case was
of this type.
If complete interim relief is defined as delaying the deprivation of federal rights until
the conclusion of the administrative process, it is possible to argue that no cause of action
exists under section 1983 during the interim period. This comment, however, takes the
generally accepted position that the federal cause of action exists after the initial administrative action, but that adjudication in the federal courts can be postponed until
administrative remedies are exhausted.
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Court held in Monroe 2 that the federal remedy was supplementary to
the state remedy, the failure to require exhaustion of state remedies in
that case took place in a context in which the deprivation of federal
rights-accomplished through the misconduct of local police 63 -had
already occurred and could not be avoided through interim state relief.
The only method to achieve immediate protection of federal rights in
Monroe was a state court or federal court action, and the plaintiff in
Monroe had a right to choose a federal forum.
There is one group of cases in which even the availability of complete interim relief during the state administrative process will not
provide an adequate administrative remedy. If a section 1983 plaintiff
can prove bad faith harassment on the part of state administrative officials, the state administrative remedy is inadequate and a relaxed
exhaustion requirement is appropriate. Although the cost of exhausting
state administrative remedies is usually not sufficient to make the administrative remedy inadequate, 64 immediate protection of federal
rights requires a relaxed exhaustion requirement when the plaintiff is
able to prove that the state is using the cost of administrative appeals to
harass or deter those seeking to enforce section 1983 rights. 5 The administrative remedy in cases of bad faith harassment is adequate in
theory but inadequate in practice. 66
02 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).

63 In Monroe, a Black family alleged that Chicago police officers broke into their apartment at 5:45 A.M., woke the parents and forced them to stand naked while the children
were routed from their beds and herded into the living room. The plaintiffs further
alleged that they were subjected to physical and verbal abuse, that their apartment was
ransacked and that the father was detained on "open" charges for ten hours. He was
neither brought before a magistrate nor advised of his procedural rights. He was later
released without being charged. Id. at 169.
64 In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938), Justice Brandeis
stated the general principle that mere unrecoupable litigation expense did not constitute
the type of injury which would require circumvention of administrative remedies. As
Professor Jaffe has written: "The expense and woe of litigation are risks to which whatever the modes of justice-and though one may win in the end-we are all subject."
L. JAFFE, supra note 2,at 428.
65 An analogous case was presented by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in which
plaintiffs sought a federal injunction against a state criminal prosecution. The Court held
that an injunction would not be routinely granted and required that the circumstances of
-a case must "establish the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated
with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith, that had always been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention." Id. at 48 (1971). In holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet this standard, the Court indicated that the standard could be met by
either a single prosecutionmade in bad faith or a series of repeated prosecutions. Id. at 49.
60 A state agency may engage in bad faith harassment by placing unreasonable conditions upon the provision of services. For instance, it may adhere to a very strict "law of
the case" approach to administration and require a client to follow a lengthy series of
administrative appeals to determine his rights when, by any fair standard, the rights of
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Federal Protection of Fundamental Federal Rights

The argument has frequently been made that exhaustion of state
administrative remedies should not be required in section 1988 cases
67
because federal rights are entitled to enforcement in a federal forum.
This argument is based on the proposition that federal courts should
not decline the exercise of federal jurisdiction simply because another

forum is available to enforce the asserted rights.08 A relaxed exhaustion requirement, however, is not necessary to insure eventual federal
enforcement of fundamental federal rights.
A litigant's right to enforcement of section 1983 rights in a federal
forum is preserved intact despite an exhaustion requirement because

state administrative agency determinations do not create res judicata
or collateral estoppel effects. 69 The exhaustion of state administrative
remedies postpones rather than precludes the assertion of federal jurisdiction.7 0 A section 1983 litigant can pursue his claim in the federal dis-

trict courts after an adverse state administrative decision, and the district
court proceeding is an original rather than an appellate proceeding. Althe individual have been determined in similar litigation or proceedings. It may also
engage in practices such as requiring recipients to register for various services at excessively
inconvenient locations or times, such as requiring all welfare recipients in Chicago to
register at City Hall. The principal difficulty in this situation arises when the conditions
are minimally burdensome to an individual but pernicious to society in the aggregate. A
central problem of constitutional law is, as Professor Kalven has noted, that "often the
great constitutional issues involve only modest private interests." H. KALVEN, JR., THE
NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AMENDm:ENT 79 (1965). But cf. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
67 See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963); Chevigny, supra note 30, at
1359.
68 Insofar as judicial remedies are concerned, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961),
established that the plaintiff is effectively granted the right to choose his forum under
section 1983. The rationale for this choice of forum is the potential res judicata and
collateral estoppel effects of state court judgments. If the plaintiff is required to sue first
in state court, he will not then be able to bring his section 1983 action in federal court
insofar as the state court judgment creates collateral estoppel effects. See Bacon v. Rutland
R.R., 232 U.S. 134, 138 (1914). The same argument does not apply with regard to administrative remedies because there the specter of res judicata or collateral estoppel does
not appear; the only cost of requiring exhaustion is the delay involved in any such process. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908). This distinction was applied
to section 1983 cases in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).
60 See text and notes at notes 54-60 supra & note 71 infra. Different problems may arise
where the exhaustion issue concerns the exhaustion of federal administrative remedies,
because of the greater weight given the determination of a federal agency's findings. See
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). See also Judge Wright's discussion of exhaustion of federal administrative remedies in Bannercraft Clothing Co. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 354-61 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70 See Petroleum Exploration Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 219 (1938);
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938).
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though the findings of a state agency are entitled to some deference,
71
they do not create collateral estoppel effects.
The absence of res judicata or collateral estoppel effects when state
administrative remedies are exhausted can be compared with the effects
when federal administrative remedies are exhausted or when a federal
court abstains pending a state court decision on state law issues. A federal administrative agency's determination will be upheld on review
by a federal court if "reasonable," even though the court might have
72
reached a different conclusion if it made a de novo judgment. Similarly, under the abstention doctrine, a federal court is bound by a state
court determination of state and federal issues submitted by the litigant
to the state court.78
Exhaustion of adequate administrative remedies in section 1983 cases
allows the state agency to apply its expertise, develop a factual record,
and cure its own errors without prejudicing the litigant's right to a
federal forum.
C.

Section 1983: The Legislative Intent

In Monroe the Court discussed at length the historical background 74
and the legislative intent of the framers of section 1983. It concluded
that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act was three-fold: (1) to override
certain kinds of state laws that were inconsistent with federal law; (2) to
provide a federal remedy where state law was inadequate; and (3) to
71 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
72 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
73 See C. WmIGHT, supra note 17, at § 52; W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 12, at

§ 64.
74, 65 U.S. 167, 172-82 (1961). Grant believed in early 1871 that a situation close to
rebellion existed in the states of the former confederacy. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., 244 (1871) (President Grant's Message to Congress of March 23, 1871). For a variety
of views regarding the reliability of Grant's perceptions of the situation in the Southern
states in early 1871, see C. BowaRs, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REvOLUTION AFaTR LINCOLN
340-47 (1929); W. DUNNING, REcONsTRucTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 1865-1877, at 186-87
(1962); J. FRANItmN, RECONsrRUCrION: Arm THE CiviL WAR 165-68 (1961). An excerpt
from a speech by Representative Kelley of Pennsylvania should indicate the hysterical
flavor of Congressional response to the alleged state of affairs in the South:
Violence is to be expected under such circumstances. Violence, sporadic, emotional,
sudden, riotous, turbulent, we were to expect. But the possibility of organized, armed,
trained, drilled, sworn bands of murderers, who should murder for political effect,
came not within the scope of my imagination. Yet the proofs are glaring as the sun
at noonday or the stars in a moonless and cloudless night that this state of affairs has
existed and does exist to a large extent among men who are bound by the highest
honorable obligation known to soldiers, a parole of honor, to remain at peace ....
I repeat, sir, that this is war. And that the facts known to us would justify ... the
President to use the United States Army in the suppression of armed rebellion and
the establishment of law and order. The bill ... proposes no such violent remedy as
this.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 339 (1871).
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provide a federal remedy where the state remedy was available in theory
but not in practice. 75 One must conclude from this statement of legislative purpose that Congress intended to deny state authorities the opportunity to redress harms in this area only where the state is unable or
unwilling to provide a fair and efficacious remedy.78 Although the
state judicial remedy is always inefficacious because its res judicata and
collateral estoppel effects jeopardize the litigant's right to a federal
forum, the state administrative remedy is subject to no such infirmity
and its adequacy must be judged by its merits.
In the Court's view, Congress was least concerned with nullifying
state laws; its quarrel was not with state statutes then on the books, but
with their lack of even-handed enforcement. 77 Discriminatory state statutes, however, present the strongest case for not requiring exhaustion;
where the statute is clear, administrative procedures are unlikely to
provide any significant relief. Even there, however, categorical rejection
of exhaustion is inappropriate. Assuming a state statute is inconsistent
with federal law, exhaustion may be appropriate for the purpose of
developing a factual record, receiving the benefit of agency expertise
in the administration of its statutes and rules, and allowing the agency
78
to limit the application of the statute consistently with federal law.
Only where a factual record is irrelevant and the statute is both
facially unconstitutional and incapable of any appropriate construction
is exhaustion without value.
The second and third congressional purposes-to provide a federal
remedy where the state remedy is inadequate on its face or in practicerequire application of the exhaustion principle for their fulfillment. If
the threshold for federal intervention is the inadequacy of the state
remedy, it is unreasonable to foreclose a state officer with the willingness
and authority to correct the errors of his subordinates from doing so.
If Congress sought to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy
is not adequate in fact, it follows that the legislative intent requires
adequate remedies to be exhausted. The third element of congressional
purpose requires that the federal court inquire not only into the state
remedy's adequacy as it appears from statute and regulation, but also
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
76 The legislative history indicates that Congress was primarily concerned with abuses
75

that occurred both "under the forms of law," see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App.
277 (1871) (speech of Representative Porter), and "permanently and as a rule," see CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 334 (1871) (speech of Representative Hoar). Something akin
to a systematic state policy was the target of the legislative action.
77 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961).
78 See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
193 (1969).
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its adequacy in practice. Rather than precluding exhaustion, this element suports the exhaustion requirement, since there is no reason to
distinguish between adequate and inadequate remedies if the exhaustion principle is to be abrogated in all section 1983 cases.
In short, the legislative intent was not to create a complete substitute
for all state remedies, but rather to provide a federal remedy where
state remedies are inadequate on their face or in practice, or where a
state law, as applied, is inconsistent with federal law. In both situations
cases can arise that require exhaustion for their proper resolution.
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE ExHAUSInON REQUIREMENT

Complete relaxation of the exhaustion of state administrative remedies requirement in section 1983 cases is unnecessary to insure immediate protection of federal rights or to guarantee the litigant's right to
a federal forum. A modified exhaustion requirement, modeled on section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act,7 9 can maximize effective
protection of federal rights and minimize the unnecessary dislocation
of legitimate state administration.
A. Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act
The APA provides for judicial review of final agency action except
to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review or commit agency
action to agency discretion. Section 704 of the Act provides:
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action
otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether
or not there has been presented or determined an application for
a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.8 0
This section of the APA differs from the judicial doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in two important ways. First, under
section 704, a litigant is not required to exhaust intra-agency appeals
unless the right to appeal is given by statute or agency rule. This provision places upon the legislature or administritive agency the burden
of establishing an appeals mechanism before exhaustion can be required. Second, and more important, section 704 requires that the
effect of preliminary agency determination be suspended while the
79 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970).
80 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
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appeal is pending. This requirement transforms a discretionary equitable remedy into a mandatory legal remedy, and thus effectively protects a litigant from even interim deprivations of his rights.
B. Application of the Section 704 Model to Section 1983 Cases
A modified section 704 approach to exhaustion of state administrative remedies in section 1983 cases can provide immediate protection

of fundamental federal rights, guarantee the litigant's choice of a federal forum, and achieve efficient allocation of judicial resources. Using
section 704 as a basic model, the federal courts should require exhaustion of state administrative remedies where: (1) an orderly system of
appeals is provided by statute or agency rule; (2) the administrative
remedies are adequate; and (3) the system of appeals provides full interim relief by protecting the litigant's rights under section 1983 until
the administrative process has been concluded.
A presumption of adequacy should exist in favor of the administrative appeal process, and exhaustion should be required unless the litigant rebuts that presumption. Where the litigant seeks to preserve the
status quo, the availability of complete interim relief creates a strong
presumption in favor of the adequacy of the remedy, but proof of bad
faith harassment would rebut the presumption. Where the litigant
seeks to alter the status quo, the analysis is more complicated, because
the agency can employ the appeals mechanism to deny federal rights.
If, for example, the litigant's object is integration of a racially segregated school district, a lengthy administrative appeals process would
frustrate compliance with federal standards. The presumption of adequacy is weaker in this group of cases because of the agency's possible
interest in delay, and the presumption should be rebuttable by proof
of irreparable injury, interminable delay, excessive expense, or bad
faith harassment.
CONCLUSION

Application of a modified section 704 approach to the exhaustion
requirement in section 1983 cases is based on a simple principle: where
state administrative remedies are fair and adequate and provide complete interim relief, no legitimate interest is served through a relaxation
of the exhaustion requirement. The modified section 704 approach
provides immediate protection for section 1983 rights, guarantees the
litigant's right to a federal forum, and achieves the legislative purposes
of section 1983 with a minimum of interference with legitimate state
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interests. Moreover, the suggested approach would act as an incentive
for state agencies to provide complete interim relief during the state
administrative process, so as to assure themselves an opportunity to correct their own errors.
Barry Sullivan

